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CONFLICT OF LAWS: NORTH CAROLINA RETAINS
TRADITIONAL SYSTEM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
THE conflict of laws system has traditionally consisted of a body of
choice of law rules together with ancillary principles dictating the
manner of their application. For more than a generation, this
method of solving conflicts problems has been subject to increasing
criticism.' In the recent case of Shaw v. Lee,2 the North Carolina
Supreme Court applied the orthodox conflicts rule that the law of
the place of injury governs in a tort case, and reached a result which
clearly demonstrates the necessity for a reexamination and perhaps
an outright abolition of the traditional system.
Plaintiff was injured and her husband killed in an automobile
collision occurring as a result of the husband's negligence. Al-
though the event took place in Virginia, suit was instituted in North
Carolina, the residence of plaintiff, her husband, and the defendant
administrator. While a North Carolina statute allows interspousal
suits, 3 Virginia forbids a wife to sue either her husband or his
personal representative for personal injuries negligently inflicted.4
The North Carolina Supreme Court, adhering to the traditional
system and following a numerically impressive list of precedents,3
applied the law of the place of the wrong to this tort action and
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff argued
that, since North Carolina is concerned with incidents of the marital
relationship between a husband and wife living in the state, the law
of the domicile should be applied. 6 In rejecting this argument, the
"See generally, CooK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASEs OF THE CONFLIcr OF LAws (1942);
Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKm L.J. 1; Ehrenzweig,
The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the
Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy, and
the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE LJ. 736 (1924); Weintraub, A Method for Solving
Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963); Yntema, The Hornbook Method
and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928).
2 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1951).
' The law of Virginia in this field emanated from Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs,
123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918). As evidenced by recent deisions, this still represents
the law of that state. See, e.g., Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960);
Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955).
5E.g., Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941); Howard v. Howard, 200
N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931) (factually identical with Shaw v. Lee).
'Brief for Plaintiff, p. 3.
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court noted that the application of this choice-of-law rule could not
be justified by either the law of Virginia or the law as declared by
the North Carolina General Assembly and the applicable North
Carolina decisions. Refusing to depart from well established con-
flict rules, the court, without examining the policies involved, applied
the law of the place of injury, thus rendering the defendant immune
from suit.
The system adopted by the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,7
was designed primarily to secure uniformity8 Under the Restate-
ment approach, a conflicts problem is first characterized, for example
as one of contract. After this has been done, the choice-of-law rule
which governs that particular area is applied.9 The lex loci, or law
of the place of injury, governs in those situations where a case has
been characterized as a tort action.10 In 1931, the highest courts of
three states, one of which was North Carolina, independently de-
cided three cases factually similar to Shaw v. Lee by applying this
traditional rule.". Although criticized by commentators, 2 this de-
T RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).8 See, e.g., Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws; Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARV. L. RIv. 361 (1945). But see Currie, supra note 1, at 38 asserting that
"simplicity and uniformity come too high when the effect on state policies and interests
is totally disregarded."
9See generally, Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or Characterization
Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE LJ. 743 (1941).
Professor Hancock, speaking of the characterization of a case similar to Shaw v.
Lee both factually and in result, stated: "Having adopted.. . basic (conflicts) principles,
the court was confronted with the familar task of classifying or characterizing the
domestic rules of ... law. Were they rules concerning the effect of marriage on prop-
erty rights, rules of tort liability, or rules relating to remedy? In other words, the
court defined . . . its problem .. . as one of fitting the domestic rules into the cate-
gories of the choice-of-law principles." Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v.
Buckeye, 1931-1959: Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. C1. L.
REv. 237, 246 (1962).
10 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 378 (1934).
For a discussion of the possible origins of this rule, see Ford, Interspousal Liability
for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the
Restatement, 15 U. PITr. L. REv. 397, 404 (1954). The attractiveness of selecting
the place of injury as the proper reference point for tort liability lies perhaps in the
fact that it is usually not difficult to ascertain. Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong"
Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 34 WASH. L. REv. 388, 390 (1959).
"I Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931); Dawson v. Dawson,
224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
2 COOK, supra note 1, at 250 (policy dictates application of the law of the
domicile); STIUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 187 (1st ed. 1937) (domiciliary law should be
applied in such domestic relation situations); Rheinstein, Michigan Legal Studies: A
Review, 41 MICH. L. Rv. 83, 97 (1942) (irrespective of place of injury, domestic rela-
tion cases should be determined by the same law).
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cisional triumvirate has been followed by New Hampshire,13 New
York,1 4 Connecticut, 0 and Missouri.' 6
However, various methods exist to avoid the lex loci when its
application would produce an undesired result. Even in inter-
spousal immunity cases characterized as tort actions, some courts
have held that applying the law of the place of injury would be
,contrary to local public policy, and thus have applied the law of
the forum. In several cases, for example, one spouse attempted to.
recover from the other in the state of domicile where interspousal im-
munity existed, after an accident occurred in a state which had
abolished such immunity.'7 In each instance, the existence of the
forum state's interspousal immunity caused the court to apply its
own law and dismiss the complaint.
In addition to avoiding an undesirable result by disregarding the
lex loci in deference to local public policy, the conflicts system itself
may be manipulated to avoid such a result by characterizing the
problem in such a way that application of a different choice-of-law
rule is demanded. Several such rules are available in the factual
situation presented by Shaw v. Lee.'8 Two of these would have
prevented the North Carolina court from reaching a decision which
rejected its state policy of allowing interspousal suits between resi-
dent spouses, denied recovery to a widow protected by local statute,
and entrusted the remedy of this situation to a state whose only
connection with the action was having been the scene of the
accident.'9
First, the problem of interspousal immunity could have been
characterized as procedural, necessitating application of the law of
28 Gray v.*Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 508 (1934).
4 Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943).
25 Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955).
'1 Robinson v. Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960).
'1 Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn.
204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1956); Poling v.
Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
18 The doctrine of renvoi is another method that could be used in some cases to
reach a desirable result. However, "American scholars, almost without exception, re-
jected the doctrine as having no place in our law." BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1886-
1036 889 (1937). Aside from this fact, this rule that the law of the place of injury
governs is a reference to the whole law of that state, including its choice-of-law rules,
would not change the result in Shaw v. Lee even if it were applied. No Virginia
4ecision supports an application of the law of the domicile.
19 In effect, the North Carolina court left the determination of what was essentially
a North Carolina matter to the courts or legislature of Virginia. 258 N.C. at 616, 129
S.E.2d at 292.
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the forum.2 0 In refusing to allow interspousal suits, it could be
argued that Virginia is not implying that the wife has no cause of
action for her husband's wrongful conduct, but rather is saying that
procedurally she has no capacity to sue.21  The law of the forum
determines capacity to sue, the remedies available, and the procedure
of the courts.- However, the court in Shaw v. Lee, rejecting a
procedural characterization which would have demanded application
of its own law allowing interspousal suits, said the question was
not a procedural one of the wife's capacity to sue, but rather a sub-
stantive one of whether there was, ever any cause of action.23  In
these metaphysical terms, the North Carolina court frustrated its
state policy.
Although a procedural characterization would have produced
a desirable result in Shaw v. Lee, the resulting application of the
law of the forum is not advocated for all cases involving a question
of interspousal immunity. Had the parties in Shaw v. Lee been
domiciled in Virginia, for example, the North Carolina court,
having no interest in the parties involved, would have no reason to
apply its law and disregard the common law immunity adhered
to by Virginia. Virginia, on the other hand, has a policy of dis-
allowing suits between resident spouses.
Secondly, there is the rule upon which plaintiff in Shaw v. Lee
principally relied, that the immunities from suit because of a family
relationship should be determined by the law of the domicile.2 4 In
2 0 RESTArEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs §§ 584, 585 (1934). See generally, McClintock,
Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 78 U. PA. L. REv.
933 (1930).
Several courts have characterized a problem as procedural in order to reach a
desired result. For example, in Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 NE. 1026 (1895),
the later Mr. Justice Holmes effectuated a Massachusetts state policy of preventing
fraud and perjury by a procedural characterization which demanded application of
the law of the forum. See also, Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944
(1953), where Justice Traynor determined that survival of a cause of action is governed
by the law of the forum.
21 See, e.g., Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
This is based upon the common law fiction of unity of the person, where a wife
could not sue unless joined by her husband. Phillips v. Barnet, [1876] 1 Q.B.D. 436.
In effect, to allow an interspousal suit would be to allow a husband to recover from
himself. A state which has abolished interspousal immunity faces no such procedural
problem.
22 R STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 584, 585 (1934).
See, e.g., Mertz v. Mertz, supra note 21. Cf. Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 52 Ga. App.
338, 340, 183 S.E. 210, 212 (1935). The court here stated that "under the general
rule, the law of the forum governs as to parties and the right to sue ...
2 '258 N.C. at 615, 129 S.E.2d at 292.
21 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 3.
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Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co.,25 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
overruled its counterpart to Shaw v. Lee26 and held that since the
decision of whether interspousal immunity is grounded on considera-
tions of family harmony, the law of the state most concerned with
the domestic relations of the spouses involved should govern. The
court envisaged no more justifiable situation in which to depart
from stare decisis, noting that there are strong policy reasons for
supplanting the rule of lex loci, and its contingency upon a fortui-
tous event, with one which does not potentially discriminate against
the forum state's citizens. The North Carolina court discussed
Haumschild but refused to follow it.27
However, as is the case with all traditional choice-of-law rules,
reliance on the law of the domicile may be satisfactory in one case
but not in another. For example, in Bogen v. Bogen,28 a tort action
was instituted in North Carolina for injuries occurring there in an
automobile accident. Parties to the suit were residents of Ohio, a
state having interspousal immunity. Personal injuiries within the
state are of concern to North Carolina, for the injured party may
financially burden the state or its inhabitants who have provided
medical and other services for which they should be compensated.
The court, in allowing recovery in this case, properly rejected the
interspousal immunity of the state of the domicile.
In Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), Justice Traynor stated
that in family relationships and the disabilities to sue arising therefrom, the law of
the domicile should govern. "[I]t is undesirable that the ... immunities... imposed
by the family relationship should constantly change as members of the family cross
state boundaries during temporary absences from their home." Id. at 428, 289 P.2d
at 223.
Accord, Koplik v. C.P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958) (application
of lex loci interferes with policy of domicile); Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l
Bank, 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958) (wife's cause of action determined by the law
of domicile); Pittman v. Deiter, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 360 (1957); Jaeger v. Jaeger,
262 Wis. 14, 53 N.W.2d 740 (1952).
2r 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), 73 HARV. L. Rav. 785 (1960).
26 Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931) (lex loci applied). For
an explanation of the judicial processes and the policy that led to the overruling of this
leading case, see Hancock, supra note 9.
27 258 N.C. at 614, 129 S.E.2d at 291.
28219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941). The court in this case reached a just result
by applying the law of the place of injury. However, had Shaw v. Lee overruled
Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931), and reached a just result on the
basis of applying the law of the domicile, it would have also had to overrule this case.
It is another flaw in the system when a court, in order to reach a desired result, must
overrule another case which was rationally decided. See Hancock, supra note 9, at
267. In two separate cases, if the facts decisive to judgment are diametrically opposed,
it is impossible to formulate one positive rule of law capable of working satisfactory
Vol. 1963: 537]
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There is merit to the Wisconsin court's approach of applying
the choice-of-law rule which effectuates the interest of the state in
protecting itself and its citizens. In fact, there seems to be an in-
creasing desire on the part of the courts to seek out policies to guide
their decisions even though they are still channelled through tradi-
tional choice-of-law rules. 29  However, even if a particular conflict
rule is applied to reach a just result, the real reason for decision may
not be articulated. The legislature, unsure of the particular policy
used to decide a given case, has no basis upon which to react. A
court may not have correctly interpreted legislative policy,80 or have
refused to apply it in the face of heavy precedent.31 Moreover, there
is no way to insure a satisfactory result in a later case, even if the
legislature subsequently changes its policies. Furthermore, if a court
is free to reach a desired result by manipulating choice-of-law rules,
the uniformity valued so highly by defenders of the orthodox system
will not be present.
This artifiicial system which ignores the content of the laws in-
volved should give way to an approach which will deal directly with
the problem involved in the particular case. Various replacements
have been suggested,32 one of which is the governmental-interest
results in both cases. See, e.g., Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problems, 47
HARv. L. REv. 173, 178-82, 189-91 (1933).
29 See generally, Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 657
(1959). The California Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Traynor, was the
leader in the departure from the Restatement. In Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289
P.2d 218 (1955), the court held immunity from suit because of a family relationship
was properly determined by the law of the domicile. Prior to that, the court had
looked to its policies before characterization in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264
P.2d 944 (1953).
3* "is is probably the case in Shaw v. Lee, where the court stated that in abolishing
interspousal immunity, the General Assembly did not intend to create a right of action
in a spouse for acts occurring beyond the North Carolina border. The statute did
not contain any express territorial limitations. N.C. GEN. STAT. §52-10.1 (1951). By
so limiting a law, a state sacrifices its policies without gaining the benefits of greater
uniformity. See Lorenzen, supra note 1, at 751.
"'Before considering plaintiff's argument, the court in Shaw v. Lee illustrated this
point. "Notwithstanding the enormous preponderance of authority supporting the
conclusions reached in Howard v. Howard, plaintiff seeks a different result." 258 N.C.
at 614, 129 S.E.2d at 291.
"- Professor Ehrenzweig has called for a more rational basis for determing which
law to apply than the fortuitous place of injury. He proposes using the basic law of
the forum, subject to certain settled exceptions. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori.
Basic Rule in Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. Rav. 637 (1960); Ehrenzweig, The Le% Fori
in the Conflict of Laws-Exception or Rule?, 82 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 13 (1959).
Cheatham has formulated three guiding policies as bases for the choice of law to
be applied: (1) the policies of local law, (2) the policies of interstate-international
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analysis.38 This process of interest analysis treats conflicts within
the normal methods of statutory construction and interpretation
of common law rules.3 4  A court would therefore decide a conflicts
question in the same manner that it would decide any other legal
question, rather than be forced to invoke artificial and unrelated
rules. This analysis is concerned with ways in which respective
states are related to the parties, the events, and the litigation. It
asks whether the circumstances surrounding these relationships
furnish a reasonable basis for the forum state's assertion of an interest
in applying an economic, social, or administrative policy embodied
in its law. A forum should apply its own law if analysis reveals that
it has a legitimate interest in the effectuation of the policy embodied
in its law.35
Such an approach would demand an application of the law of
the forum in Shaw v. Lee. Since the North Carolina statute permits
interspousal suits, the state has a policy of compensating one spouse
injured through the negligence of another. A spouse without
remedy may become a charge upon the state. Virginia, in adhering
to the common law fiction of interspousal immunity, has a policy of
protecting family harmony and preventing trumped up claims against
systems, and (3) the competing policies of definiteness through rules as contrasted
with justice in the particular case. CHEATHAm, GOODRICH, G iSwoLD & REESE, CAsEs
ON CONFLICr OF LAWS (Supp. 1961, at 69).
Another modern view is laying emphasis upon the law of the place which has the
most significant contacts with the matter in dispute. See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 9
N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961). These contacts are weighed
and the "center of gravity" is ascertained. For a critical comparison of this view with
the governmental-interest analysis, see Currie, supra note 1, 39-52.
"aSee, e.g., Currie, supra note 1; Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in
Conflict of Laws Method, 25 U. Ci. L. REv. 227 (1958); Currie, Survival of Actions:
Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958).
Several cases have used such an approach. See, e.g., Watson v. Employer's Liab.
Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm's, 294
U.S. 532 (1935). See also, Pearson v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1962), reversing 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9
N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
But see, e.g., Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to
Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 463 (1960); M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Profes-
sor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 845 (1961).
11 See, e.g., Currie & Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines: A
Study in Conflict of Law Method, 1960 Duut L.J. 1,
"5 Professor Currie states that as the forum is determining the interest of its state,
it should realize the possibility of a conflict with a foreign state's interest, and moderate
its interpretation of local policy accordingly. Currie, supra note 1, at 30.
For a decision in which such restraint is used and the law of the foreign state
applied, see Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906
(1961) (Traynor, J.).
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insurance companies. Since both the parties were domiciled in
North Carolina, Virginia has no interest in applying its policy.30
North Carolina, on the other hand, with its policy of protecting
the plaintiff widow, has an interest in applying this policy in the
instant case, since plaintiff is a resident of North Carolina. There-
fore, in applying the law of the place of injury, the North Carolina
court subverted its own state's policy without advancing the policy
of Virginia.3 7
The traditional system, adopted by the Restatement in the name
of uniformity, often yields unjust results. If the traditional system
remains, the forum should look to its policy and interest in effectu-
ating it in the case at hand before characterizing the conflicts prob-
lem. However, each manipulation of this sort destroys the tradition-
alist's defense of uniformity and its resultant certainty and predicti-
bility. Furthermore, even under an increasingly enlightened system,
the bonds of precedent will sometimes be indestructible. In Shaw
v. Lee, the court applied the lex loci because of "enormous pre-
ponderance of authority" and refused to "venture into uncharted
seas.' 38 Such a decision illustrates the inherent weakness of a
system which is composed of artificial and arbitrary rules. A govern-
mental-interest analysis, which looks to the content of the law in-
volved and determines whether the circumstances provide a reason-
able basis for application of policies expressed therein, is a suggested
replacement.
"Virginia may have a policy of protecting its liability insurers against collusive
claims, but this does not give that state an interest in applying its policy in this case.
Automobile liability insurance rates are based upon loss experience in artificially de-
fined territories. "A claim against an entrepreneur is allocated to his territory even
if the accident giving rise to the claim. was outside the territory .... ." Morris,
Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70
YALE L.J. 554, 565 (1961). Since the assured's territory is normally that in which
he resides, the result in Shaw v. Lee would in no way affect Virginia's insurance
rate. See, Currie, supra note 1, at 28.
7 Since there is no conflict between Virginia's interest in applying the common
law rule and the North Carolina statute allowing interspousal suits, this is a false
conflict case. According to Professor Currie, the mere mention of two state's laws
does not produce a true conflict. It is only when each state has an interest in the
application of its law that a true conflict arises. Currie, supra note 1, at 38. In the
instant case, North Carolina has a legitimate interest in applying its policy. Virginia
does not. For a functional analysis of other such cases, see Currie, supra note 33;
Hancock, supra note 9; Traynor, supra note 29.
88 258 N.C. at 616, 129 S.E.2d at 293.
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